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HABEAS CORPUS: INTERSTATE DETAINERS
AND IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
Presently, a prisoner confined in one state subject to a de-
tainerl issued by another state cannot attack the detainer's va-
lidity and its present effects on the prisoner's confinement in a
single habeas corpus proceeding. Rather, the prisoner must peti-
tion a district court in the demanding state for a determination
of the validity of the detainer, and another district court in the
confining state for relief from the present effects of the detainer.
The inability of a district court in either state to adjudicate both
claims simultaneously stems from its lack of in personam juris-
diction over the prisoner's custodian in the other state. After
outlining the history of the current procedure, this Comment
will examine means by which a single court could adjudicate all
claims relating to a foreign detainer when desirable to do so.
I. FOREIGN DETAINERS: THE PROBLEM STATED
In 1968, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of habeas
corpus in Peyton v. Rowe2 by allowing a prisoner confined in one
state subject to a detainer issued by another state to attack. collat-
erally the validity of the foreign detainer without having to com-
plete beforehand the sentence imposed by the confining state.
3
The result in Peyton was particularly consequential for a prisoner
subject to a foreign detainer because of the likelihood that the
I A detainer, or hold order, is a warrant sent from one state to another to provide
notification that a prisoner is wanted in the demanding state and to request that the
confining state inform the demanding state of the prisoner's release date. The detainer
need not rest upon a conviction, but may be based upon an indictment, information,
arrest warrant, parole violator warrant, or the mere desire of the demanding state to
question the prisoner. See Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 CRIM. L.
BULL. 669, 670 (1971); Tuttle, Catch 2254: FederalJurisdiction and Interstate Detainers, 32 U.
PiTT. L. REv. 489, 491.(1971); Wexler & Hershey, Criminal Detainers in a Nutshell, 7 GRiM.
L. BULL. 753, 753 n.2 (1971); Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 WASH.
U.L.Q. 417.
2 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
3 More precisely, Peyton held that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences could
bring a habeas action to challenge any one of them. Thus after Peyton, a prisoner could
challenge a detainer based upon a conviction, but not a detainer based, for instance,
upon an arrest warrant. Broadened possibilities for attacking a detainer were established
subsequently in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), and Nelson v.
George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970). See text accompanying notes 8-22 infra.
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detainer would adversely affect the prisoner's current state of
confinement. He might be held under maximum security, disal-
lowed the privilege of assuming a trusteeship or another position
of responsibility, denied parole, or refused consideration for re-
habilitation programs.4
Although Peyton opened an avenue for redress of certain
deleterious effects of the foreign detainer, the decision created a
perplexing choice-of-forum problem: When subject to a de-
tainer, should a prisoner petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal district court in the state in which he is confined or in the
state that has issued the detainer? The controlling federal statute
states that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Su-
preme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any
circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions."5 In 1948, the
phrase "within their respective jurisdictions" was interpreted in
Ahrens v. Clark6 as denying a district court subject matter jurisdic-
tion to grant the writ unless the person in custody was within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial presence of the
prisoner's custodian was deemed insufficient.7 Consequently, a
district court in one state was regarded automatically as lacking
habeas jurisdiction over a convict confined in another state.
On the other hand, even though the requirement of ter-
ritoriality enabled the district court in the confining state to
claim subject matter jurisdiction over the prisoner, the custodian
I Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969); Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352,
354 (4th Cir. 1969); see Dauber, supra note 1, at 691-96; Schornhorst, Presentence Confine-
ment and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1085-86 (1972);
Tuttle, supra note 1, at 491-93; Note, supra note 1, at 418-23.
A federal regulation proscribes a detainer's automatically barring parole considera-
tion. 28 C.F.R. § 2.33(e) (1975) provides: "The presence of a detainer is not of itself a
valid reason for the denial of parole. It is recognized that where the prisoner appears to
be a good parole risk, there may be distinct advantage in granting parole despite a
detainer."
Despite the adverse effects on prisoners' confinement, detainers are easy to file and
their legal justification is rarely examined. Detainers may serve as an effective means of
punishing without first convicting: "Many detainers are apparently filed for punitive
reasons; they are withdrawn shortly before the convict's release, having served their
purpose by curtailing prison privileges and preventing parole. According to one estimate,
as many as one half the detainers are never pursued by the requesting authority." Gold-
farb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 229 n.345
(1970); see Dauber, supra note I (statistical study of detainers in Massachusetts); Tuttle,
supra note 1, at 492; Note, supra note 1, at 422-23.
5 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970). The statutes governing habeas corpus generally are
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
6 335 U.S. 188 (1948), criticized in Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1162-65 (1970).
335 U.S. at 190.
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in the state that issued the detainer might escape the reach of
service of process. Thus, although a prisoner after Peyton was
entitled to bring a habeas action to attack an out-of-state de-
tainer, he was caught in a dilemma: In one of the two districts in
which the writ could be sought, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction; in the other, it lacked in personam jurisdiction over
the custodian in the other state.
The fundamental unfairness of this situation was soon rec-
ognized by the courts. The 1969 case of George v. Nelson 8 in-
volved a California prisoner who petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal district court in California to attack the con-
viction underlying a North Carolina detainer. The Ninth Circuit
solved the challenge to personal jurisdiction by declaring the
California warden a proper respondent because he was not only
the actual custodian but also an agent of North Carolina.9 The
circuit court indicated that if the warden did not desire to de-
fend the conviction, he could importune the appropriate North
Carolina authorities to do so.10
The issue of the soundness of this approach was left in
abeyance, however, when the Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit decision without reaching the question whether a
state prisoner could test in the confining state the validity of the
conviction underlying a foreign detainer." Because the prisoner
challenged not only the conviction underlying the foreign de-
tainer but also the present effect given the detainer by the
California authorities, a matter that had not been presented to
the California courts, the Court narrowly concluded that the
prisoner had not exhausted available state remedies.' 2 Before
seeking federal relief, the prisoner should have challenged in the
California state court system any unfavorable treatment resulting
from regard by California for the North Carolina detainer. Dis-
tinguishing the present effect of the detainer from its general
validity, the Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court
insofar as it recognized jurisdiction in the district court to enter-
tain the prisoner's claims regarding the impact of the detainer if
8 410 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1969), affd on other grounds, 399 U.S. 224 (1970).
9 410 F.2d at 1181.
10 Id.
11 399 U.S. 224 (1970). For sharp criticism of the Court's ruling in this case, see
Wexler & Hershey, supra note 1, at 776 (footnote omitted): "The default of the Su-
preme Court in George has perpetuated an intolerable jurisdictional situation, which will
exist until the Court reconsiders Ahrens or until a clarification is provided by Congress
or through the Supreme Court's legislative rule-making process."
12 399 U.S. at 229; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c) (1970).
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the prisoner chose to press those claims after exhausting his state
remedies.' 3
The Ninth Circuit's approach was rejected in the 1969 case
of Word v. North Carolina,'4 in which the Fourth Circuit held that
state prisoners confined in Virginia and subject to North
Carolina detainers could attack the convictions underlying the
detainers only in a habeas action in North Carolina. The Fourth
Circuit suggested that a federal district court in Virginia would
lack jurisdiction over the action because the confining warden in
Virginia had no duty to defend the North Carolina detainers.1
5
The circuit court noted, however, that the district court in Vir-
ginia would have jurisdiction over attacks on the present effects
of the foreign detainers.'
6
The 1973 Supreme Court decision in Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court'7 partially adopted the reasoning of Word and se-
verely limited Ahrens. An Alabama state prisoner, subject to a
Kentucky detainer based on a grand jury indictment, petitioned
a federal district court in Kentucky for a writ of habeas corpus,
after failing to obtain Kentucky state relief on his claim of denial
of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The federal district
court held that the prisoner was denied a speedy trial and or-
dered the Kentucky authorities either to secure the prisoner for
trial within sixty days or to dismiss the charges against him. 8
13 399 U.S. at 229-30.
14 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
'"Id. at 357. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), was declared noncontrolling.
The court reasoned that subsequent cases had demonstrated that presence of the pe-
titioner in the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not always required and that Ahrens
was not decided in the context of multistate detainers. 406 F.2d at 358-61.
16 406 F.2d at 357 n.6. The court qualified its holding further by indicating that
under certain circumstances fairness might require that a district court in a confining
state adjudicate claims concerning a conviction underlying a foreign detainer. Id. at 361.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit would probably not foreclose a prisoner's attacking in the state
of his confinement the validity of a foreign detainer if no other forum would hear his
claim. The Second Circuit has accepted the Word rationale that a district court in the
demanding state is usually a more convenient forum than a district court in the confin-
ing state. United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971) (noting that the court in the confining state has
concurrent juris'tictibn), discussed in Comment, Towards a Solution of the Jurisdictional
Problem in Multi-State Federal Habeas Corpus Actions Challenging Future Restraints, 1970
UTAH L. REV. 625. But see United States ex rel. Van Scoten v. Pennsylvania, 404 F.2d
767 (3d Cir. 1968); Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968) (confining-
state court is proper forum).
" 410 U.S. 484 (1973). For a discussion of this case within the post-Peyton context
of interjurisdictional detainers, see Meyer & Yackle, Collateral Challenges to Criminal
Convictions, 21 U. KAN. L. REV. 259, 283-87 (1973).
,s Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 454 F.2d 145, 146 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd,
410 U.S. 484 (1973).
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The Sixth Circuit, holding that only a court in the confining
state had jurisdiction to entertain the prisoner's habeas petition,
reversed.' 9 The prisoner could not then proceed, however, in a
district court in the state of his confinement, because the rule of
that circuit was that a district court in the demanding state was
the proper forum in which to file a petition for habeas. 20 Thus,
on review the Supreme Court could either expand the meaning
of "within their respective jurisdictions" and vitiate the interpre-
tation of Ahrens that had prevailed for twenty-five years, or de-
prive the prisoner of the only remaining forum in which he
could seek relief.21 Selecting the first alternative, the Court rein-
terpreted the "within their respective jurisdictions" language of
the federal habeas statute to require only that the court issuing
the writ of habeas corpus possess in personam jurisdiction over
the custodian to whom the writ was directed.22
After 1973, a state prisoner no longer faced the jurisdic-
tional difficulties he might have confronted earlier. Subject to a
foreign detainer, he had two options: attack the present impact
of the detainer on his incarceration in a federal district court in
the confining state under the Supreme Court's decision in George
v. Nelson, or challenge the validity of the detainer in a federal
district court of the demanding state under Braden. Unfortu-
nately, however, the prisoner still was unable to utilize a single
action to attack both the effect and the validity of the detainer.
In a subsequent Fourth Circuit case, Norris v. Georgia,23 a
North Carolina prisoner petitioned a federal district court in
North Carolina for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking dismissal of
detainers lodged against him by Georgia and Louisiana on the
ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. The district court
concluded that it had jurisdiction not only to consider the ad-
verse impact on confinement of the detainers, but also to bar
Georgia and Louisiana authorities from prosecuting petitioner
on the charges underlying the detainers.24 This result was
reached basically by interpreting Braden to say that a habeas
corpus proceeding could be brought either in the district of con-
finement or in the district where the detainer was issued.25 On
191d. at 145-48.
20 See id. at 146; May v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
21 See 410 U.S. at 488.
22 Id. at 495.
23 522 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1975).
24 Norris v. Georgia, 357 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 522 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1975).
22 An analysis of the relative convenience of each forum led the district court to
conclude that North Carolina was the proper locale. Id.
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appeal, the circuit court reversed the lower court's decision with
respect to the jurisdiction of the North Carolina district court
over claims relating to the validity of the detainers. The court
reasoned that the district court was without in personam jurisdic-
tion to challenge the validity of the underlying detainer because
it lacked capacity, within its geographic boundaries, to enforce
any order that might ensue.
26
Thus, a prisoner presently subject to a foreign detainer re-
mains in a quandary with regard to how he should attack the
detainer. Pursuing only one of either the Nelson (impact) or
Braden (validity) routes can result in no more than partial justice.
Initially, suppose the prisoner attacks the validity of the detainer
in the demanding district. Assuming that he receives a judgment
vacating the detainer, he may have to pursue further legal action
to have the decision recognized in the confining state to elimi-
nate the detainer's effects on present confinement. Such action
would be necessary if regular channels of communication be-
tween the demanding and confining authorities were lacking, or
if, for whatever reason, the actual custodian, who is not under
the jurisdiction of the district court in the demanding state, were
to refuse or fail to take note of the prisoner's successful litigation
in the demanding state.27 On the other hand, if the prisoner
were to obtain relief in the confining state from the detainer's
effects on his present confinement, the essential validity of the
detainer would remain undisturbed. Thus, upon transfer to
another custodian the deleterious effects might be reinstituted.
28
Moreover, rarely does a prisoner attack the effects of a detainer
without raising claims regarding its validity, except when merely
contesting an irregularity in the process by which the confining
state gives effect to the detainer.29
Considering the drawbacks of contesting only either the
present effect or the validity of a foreign detainer, a prisoner
desiring to attack a foreign detainer might do well to petition
both the demanding and the confining states. But beyond the
unfortunate waste of judicial resources, this procedure is techni-
26 522 F.2d at 1010. The court indicated that although the immediate custodian is
an agent of the demanding state for the purpose of establishing subject matter jurisdic-
tion, he is not an agent for the service of process incident to in personam jurisdiction.
Id. at 1010-11.
2See id. at 1016 n.3 (Winter, J., dissenting in part); cf. Craig v. Beto, 458 F.2d
1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 1972).
28 See Varallo v. Ohio, 312 F. Supp. 45, 46 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
29 Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d 1006, 1018 (4th Cir. 1975) (Winter, J., dissenting in
part).
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cally unjustifiable. Why should the prisoner have to go to court
twice when a successful attack on the validity of a detainer leaves
no doubt that the continuing impact of the detainer is unlawful?
Underlying a prisoner's inability to attack a foreign detainer
fully in a single action are the requirements for in personam
jurisdiction imposed by the federal courts. When confronted
with an action by a prisoner in one state who is subject to a
detainer issued by another state, federal district courts in both
states may possess subject matter jurisdiction. The barrier to ad-
judicating the claim is the inability of a district court in either
state to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the other state's
custodian. This Comment will now explore various theories by
which such in personam jurisdiction might be acquired.
II. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
Habeas corpus proceedings are technically civil actions.30
They are not, however, automatically subject to all rules or stat-
utes governing such actions. For example, the Supreme Court
has held that in view of the history of the writ and the intended
scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a petitioner does
not have the right to serve interrogatories on his custodian, al-
though the Federal Rules allow for broad discovery in civil
suits.3 ' Likewise, the Court has refused to apply to habeas pro-
ceedings a federal statute that provides for nationwide service of
process when the defendant is a federal officer or employee.
3 2
The Federal Rules are "applicable to proceedings for . . .
habeas corpus.., to the extent that the practice in such proceed-
ings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has
heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions."33 Rule 82
states that the Federal Rules "shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts... ,,,4
but this provision has been interpreted to refer only to subject
matter jurisdiction and not to the manner in which parties are
brought before a court.35 Accordingly, the Federal Rules may be
useful in determining the validity of service of process.36 Other
30 R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS § 2 (2d ed. 1969) (collecting cases).
31 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 292-98 (1969).
32 Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971).
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2).
3 4 Id. 82.
35 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 82.02[1], at 82-83 (2d ed. 1975).
3 6 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4; text accompanying notes 42-52 infra.
The applicability of rule 4 to habeas proceedings is technically an open question.
See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 n.5 (1969) (although holding that rule 33 does
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limitations on federal district court jurisdiction are delineated in
the habeas statutes. Once a court has obtained in personam
jurisdiction over the out-of-state custodian, the only additional
requirements for habeas relief are that the petitioner be "in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States" '37 and that he have exhausted the remedies avail-
able in the state courts.
38
The answer to the threshold question whether process can
be served effectively on an out-of-state custodian will depend on
whether the petitioner seeks to attack the foreign detainer in the
confining state or in the state that issued the detainer.
A. District Court in the Confining State:
Service of Process
In the event that a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus in a district court located in the state of his confine-
ment, in personam jurisdiction over the custodian of the forum
state may be obtained readily. Thus, the court could adjudi-
cate the prisoner's claims that relate to the present impact of a
foreign detainer. Because the court in the confining state may
be unable to acquire in personam jurisdiction over the out-of-
state custodian, however, the prisoner may be precluded from
challenging the validity of the foreign detainer. Although the
prisoner is "in custody" of the demanding state,39 the out-of-
state custodian, by virtue of his location, is not automatically sub-
ject to service of process. 40  Neverthless, under the Federal
not apply to habeas corpus actions, the Court reserved judgment on the bearing of
other rules). But no convincing rationale appears for limiting the purview of rule 4,
and courts have assumed its relevance to habeas actions. See Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d
1006, 1009 n.2 (4th Cir. 1975); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ga.
1969).
Arguably, the statutory requirement that district courts issue habeas writs only
"within their respective jurisdictions," 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970), supersedes.rule 4 and
confines courts to serving custodians only within the courts' territorial jurisdictions. See
Lee v. United States, 501 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1974); Sholars v. Matter, 491 F.2d 279 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974). But the Supreme Court has functionally defined
the "presence" of a custodian within a jurisdiction for habeas purposes as being suscep-
tible to service of process. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495
(1973); Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 345 n.2 (1972).
37 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1970).
3 Id. 88 2254(b), (c).
39 See R. SOKOL, supra note 30, at § 6.1.
40 The following discussion disregards the possibility that an out-of-state custodian
may be served with process while traveling or vacationing within the confining state.
The analysis also proceeds on the assumption that the mere invocation of general
equity considerations fails to establish in personam jurisdiction, although such a sugges-
tion has been occasionally advanced. See Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352, 366
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Rules, 41 process might be served on the out-of-state custodian
in two ways: service upon an agent and service under a long-
arm statute.
1. Service upon an Agent
The Federal Rules provide that service upon an individual
other than an infant or incompetent may be made by delivering
a copy of the summons and complaint to "an agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process. '42 When
a prisoner is subject to a foreign detainer, the actual custodian,
by holding the prisoner for the demanding state and placing
conditions on his confinement as a result of the detainer, argu-
ably functions as an agent for that state.43
The Federal Rules recognize two types of agents who are
able to receive service of process: those authorized by appoint-
ment and those authorized by law. An agent authorized by ap-
pointment is one who is in fact designated to receive service of
process. Although such an appointment may be inferred from
surrounding circumstances, the appointment is not proved
without a showing that the agent had specific authority, express
or implied, to receive service of process. The mere appointment
of an agent vested with broad authority is insufficient to establish
in personam jurisdiction,44 even though the agent actually ac-
cepts process or asserts his authority to do so. 45 Thus, absent
authorization of an agent by law, no agency to receive service of
process will be acknowledged without a rather clear showing of
an appointment of an agent for that purpose. Therefore, even if
the actual custodian were considered an agent of the demanding
state, service of process upon him would not establish in per-
sonam jurisdiction with regard to the demanding state unless the
custodian were properly authorized. Research yields no case in
which the demanding state has appointed the actual custodian to
(4th Cir. 1969) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (not specifically
addressing the problem of in personam jurisdiction): "When the consequences of a
foreign detainer are visited upon a prisoner in the place of detention, fairness to the
prisoner demands that the confining state be deemed at least a proper forum, if not the
only one, in which to challenge the detainer and the underlying conviction." See also
Bedwell v. Harris, 451 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1971).4 1 See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
43 See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 498-99 (1973); cf. Cleve-
land v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1975); Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969,
973 (8th Cir. 1973).
44 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrICE 91 4.12, at 1049-50 (2d ed. 1975).
45 1d. 5 4.12, at 1050-51 & cases cited therein.
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receive service of process. Arguments that agency exists have
relied simply on inference:
I have little doubt but that the detaining North
Carolina authority acted as an agent for the two other
states. He kept custody of Norris for them as well as for
North Carolina. Exacerbated conditions of confinement
were inflicted on Norris because of their detainers.
Whether or not Georgia or Louisiana intended that ef-
fect of their detainers is immaterial. The fact is that by
lodging the detainers the two states had continuing and
not one-time effects on Norris. The North Carolina cus-
todian did not cause these effects; he was the medium
through which they reached Norris. He was, in short,
the agent of the states which, through lodging the de-
tainers, affected Norris.
4 6
These arguments fail to demonstrate, however, that the actual
custodian was authorized by the demanding state to be an agent
for the purpose of receiving service of process.
The provision of the Federal Rules that allows service of
process upon an agent authorized by law is somewhat ambigu-
ous; whether the authorizing law is the common law, federal law,
or state law is unclear.4" Reference to the common law might
imply an estoppel theory, under which a legal relationship could
not be denied by a defendant whose actions suggested an au-
thorization of agency to receive process, on which a plaintiff
relied to his detriment.48 This estoppel theory would be of no
use to a prisoner petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, how-
ever, because the demanding state would not have misled the
prisoner to believe that his immediate custodian possessed au-
thority to receive process on behalf of the demanding state. On
the contrary, in all probability the demanding state would have
continuously denied authorization of agency, from the time it
issued the detainer. A prisoner challenging a foreign detainer
also could not establish statutory authorization of agency by fed-
eral law; federal law simply does not provide that in personam
jurisdiction over an out-of-state custodian can be obtained by
serving the custodian of the confining state. Similarly, agency to
receive process in the context of foreign detainers is generally
46 Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d 1006, 1016 (4th Cir. 1975) (Winter, J., dissenting in
part) (footnote omitted).
17 2 J. MooRE, supra note 44, 4.12, at 1052.
4 8 Id.
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not authorized by state law, although states have specifically em-
powered state officials to receive service of process in other
contexts by state long-arm statutes. 49 State long-arm statutes,
however, are precisely the means by which a district court in
a confining state may obtain in personam jurisdiction over the
custodian of a demanding state.
2. Service Under a Long-Arm Statute
The Federal Rules provide that service upon an individual
may be made in a manner "prescribed by the law of- the state in
which the district court is held for the service of summons or
other like process upon any such defendant in an action brought
in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state."'50 Thus, subject
only to due process notions of fair play and substantial justice,51
plaintiffs in federal district courts can rely on state statutes that
authorize service of process beyond the territorial boundaries
of the state.52 Such statutes have been developed in a variety
of contexts. 53 For example, states have passed legislation en-
abling courts to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state motorists
by serving process on a state official,54 over foreign insurance
companies in suits by policyholders, 55  and over out-of-state
4 9 E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); see text accompanying note 54 infra.
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7). The words "such defendant" in rule 4(d)(7) do not refer
specifically to the type of defendant involved here-an out-of-state custodian in a habeas
proceeding-but rather to any class of individuals included in rules 4(d)(1)-(3). See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (f).1 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
52 Presently existing long-arm statutes of at least some states are sufficiently broad to
encompass the proposed use. For example, Rhode Island claims jurisdiction "in ever,
case not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States." R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-5-33 (1970). A very similar California provision states: "A court of
this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States." CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). For
discussion of the California statute, see Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in
California Under New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163
(1970); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction: New Horizons in Cal fornia, 1 PACIFIC L.J. 671
(1970). California's provision has been accepted and explicated by the judiciary. As stated
in Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974): "The jurisdiction of the
California courts is therefore coextensive with the outer limits of due process under the
state and federal constitutions, as those limits have been defined by the United States
Supreme Court." Accord, Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engrs., Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th
Cir. 1975).
Note that in Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ga. 1969), the court
held that Georgia's more specific long-arm statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1 (1971), did
not enable service of process on an out-of-state custodian.
53 For a partial compilation of the diverse literature that has arisen on this subject,
see J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 99 n.6 (2d ed. 1974).54See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
55See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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tortfeasors.56 In each case, the application of the statute is
conditioned as a matter of due process on the defendant's
having established minimum contacts with the forum state and
on the claim's being related in some fashion to that state. 57
The minimum-contacts test was first announced in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.58 In that case, the Court held that
a foreign corporation was sufficiently "present" in the forum
state to allow the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the
corporation only when the corporation had such minimum con-
tacts with the forum state as make it reasonable to require the
corporation to defend a suit in that state. 59 The Court noted that
to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege
of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the
benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations,
and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a proce-
dure which requires the corporation to respond to a
suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.
60
This rationale was reaffirmed in Travelers Health Association
v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Commission,6' in which the Court
recognized a Virginia state commission's in personam jurisdic-
tion over a nonprofit corporation and its treasurer (in his official
and personal capacity), whose business activities were conducted
primarily in Nebraska because the activities were found to "reach
out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and
obligations with citizens of another state ... "62 Travelers has
been interpreted as extending the International Shoe doctrine to
noncorporate defendants, at least for certain subjects. 63
The minimum-contacts analysis has proven useful in the
context of a serviceman's petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus
to escape an allegedly unlawful military command. In Strait v.
Laird,6 4 a reserve officer petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
56See 2J. MOORE, supra note 44, 4.41-1[3], at 1291.57.
5 7 See id. 1291.51.
58 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
59 Id. at 316-17.
60Id. at 319.
61 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
62 Id. at 647.
6 2 J. MooRE, supra note 44, l 4.41-1[1], at 1291.7.
64 406 U.S. 341 (1972).
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a district court in California following the denial of his applica-
tion for conscientious objector status. Although the petitioner's
nominal commanding officer was in Indiana, the petitioner's
only meaningful contact with the army had been in California,
and the Court ruled that his commanding officer was construc-
tively present in California through the officers in the service
hierarchy who had processed the petitioner's application for
discharge. 65 The Court concluded that this "chain of command"
was a sufficient contact to distinguish Strait from an earlier case
in which a district court in Arizona was held to lack jurisdiction
to entertain a habeas proceeding by an enlisted man whose
commanding officer was located in Georgia, because no officer
had custody of or command over the petitioner in Arizona.
66
The chain-of-command theory does not fit precisely the case
of a foreign detainer because the response to the detainer by the
confining state is based not on command but on cooperation.
67
In one sense any order received by a soldier emanates from his
commanding officer, whether or not some intermediate subor-
dinate actually issues the order. Generally, the commanding of-
ficer can theoretically, if not practically, review and change
whatever order has been issued. In contrast, a state that has
lodged a detainer against a prisoner confined in another state
cannot issue any affirmative orders with respect to the prisoner's
present status, and indeed it may have no interest in how the
detainer affects the prisoner's confinement.
Nevertheless, the contacts between the defendant and the
forum state in Strait may have been less substantial than the
contacts between the custodian of a state that issues a detainer
and the state in which the prisoner who is subject to that detainer
is confined. The basis for recognizing in personam jurisdiction
in Strait was that the petitioner had established meaningful con-
tacts with the army only in California: he had never visited In-
diana, he had been commissioned in California, he had applied
for conscientious objector status in California, and he had been
in that state when his application was denied. 68 The record, how-
65 Id. at 345.
66 Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487 (1971).
6' For certain types of detainers, the cooperation is formalized in the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1389-1389.7 (West 1970), as
amended, §§ 1389.7-1389.8 (West Supp. 1976). This agreement applies only to detainers
issued for untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The cooperation thus ob-
tained resembles a contractual relationship with reciprocal rights and obligations attach-
ing to the enactment of the legislation by party states.
68 406 U.S. at 343.
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ever, failed to establish unequivocally that the petitioner had
been subject to any military orders issued by superiors in Cali-
fornia. 69 The petitioner's commanding officer, therefore, while
exerting influence over the petitioner's actions, may have done
so without interacting with or relying on intermediaries in Cali-
fornia. Thus, despite the petitioner's extensive contacts with
California, the contacts of his commanding officer with that state
were slight. The effect of a detainer, on the other hand, is to
create a continuing relationship between the prisoner, the con-
fining state, and the demanding state through the cooperative
arrangement between the demanding and confining states.
Thus, the foreign custodian, by issuing a detainer given present
effect in the confining state, 70 arguably possesses adequate con-
tact with the confining state to make it reasonable to require him
to defend a habeas corpus proceeding in that state.7'
Accordingly, in personam jurisdiction over a foreign custo-
dian might be obtained in a federal district court in the confin-
ing state by use of a state long-arm statute.72 The prisoner must,
69 Id. at 347 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70 Cf. Shelton v. Meier, 485 F.2d 1177, 1178 (9th Cir. 1973) (implying that a federal
prisoner cannot attack the validity of a foreign detainer in the confining state without
alleging adverse present impact).
71 But see Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (holding that
Georgia's long-arm statute cannot be used to secure service of process on representatives
of other states).
Technically, the respondent is not the state, but the custodian: "It is not necessary to
name a more important official than is necessary. If the prisoner is confined in a peniten-
tiary, for example, the proper respondent would be the warden, not the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States." R. SOKOL, supra note 30, § 7, at 81. Thus, throughout this
Comment the use of the terms "demanding state" and "confining state" should be read as
the more precise terms "custodian in the demanding state" and "custodian in the confin-
ing state."
72 It has been recognized that the forum state itself must generally have some
legitimate interest in allowing plaintiffs to serve process on out-of-state defendants. Yet
aside from the inconvenience and potential unfairness to prisoners if they are forced to
petition for a writ in another state, are there any state interests? This question is argu-
ably irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue in habeas proceedings because Strait and the
chain-of-command cases have shown no regard for any state interests (reasonably
enough, as only federal soldiers had been involved). Thus, a federal prisoner, petition-
ing for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the validity of a foreign detainer, probably
would not have to aver any state interest to justify using the state's long-arm statute. In
other contexts, the inequity of treating state and federal prisoners differently for
habeas purposes has been recognized, see Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,
225-26 (1969), and likewise in this context there is no justification for separate treat-
ment. Thus the due process question can be limited to a determination of the proper
usage of the statute.
Of course, due process requires that adequate notice be given the foreign custo-
dian. In International Shoe (in the context of a corporate defendant), the Court indicated
that either substituted service on some person within the forum state or service on the
defendant by mail at the defendant's home office might be proper. 326 U.S. 310, 320
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however, have exhausted his state remedies. Because he would
be attacking both the validity and the effect of a detainer, and
thereby litigating against two different states, the prisoner must
have fully pursued relief in each state, exactly as though he were
bringing two separate actions.
73
B. District Court in the Demanding State:
Service of Process
A federal district court in a state that has lodged a detainer
against a prisoner in another state has in personam jurisdiction
over the custodian in the forum state and may consequently
adjudicate the prisoner's claims relating to the validity of the
warrant, indictment, or conviction underlying the detainer. In
the interests of judicial efficiency and fairness to the prisoner,
the same court ought to be able to determine claims concerning
the detainer's present impact on the prisoner in the confining
state. The theories discussed above, however, do not even argu-
ably provide a means of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over
the custodian in the confining state. Neither agency principles
nor a long-arm statute can be used here effectively.
As already detailed, an agent can be authorized to receive
service of process by either appointment or law.74 Rarely, if ever,
will an agent be appointed by the confining state to receive ser-
vice of process in the demanding state. Nor is there any manner
in which to establish authorization of an agent by law.
The lack of any activity in the demanding state by the con-
fining state negates the possibility of employing a long-arm
statute to obtain jurisdiction over the immediate custodian. The
minimum-contacts test cannot be met.71 In contrast to the de-
manding state's connection with the confining state, in which a
structure similar to the army's chain of command links the issuer
of the detainer to the immediate custodian, no such relationship
(1945). Indeed, service is satisfactory as long as there is a reasonable assurance that
actual notice will occur. Id.
73 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (held, the prisoner
must have exhausted remedies in the demanding state related to the validity of the
detainer); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970) (held, the prisoner must have ex-
hausted remedies in the confining state related to the present effect of the detainer).
74 See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
75 Certain contracts may exist, but not at the time a prisoner would bring a habeas
action. Specifically, at or near the conclusion of the prisoner's incarceration in the con-
fining state, steps may be taken by his immediate custodian to ensure the surrender of
the prisoner to the demanding state. This action might conceivably constitute sufficient
minimum contacts, but it transpires well after the time the prisoner might desire to
attack the validity of the detainer.
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exists here. It could be argued that any command structure that
connects the demanding state to the confining state should op-
erate just as well in the reverse direction. Were there a formal
command structure, this argument might have some force for
the actions of the subordinate would in a sense be determined as
soon as the commander issued orders. Thus, the subordinate
would be constructively present wherever the commander was
present. No such formal command structure exists, however,
between the confining and demanding states. Consequently, al-
though the demanding state-having lodged a detainer against a
prisoner in the confining state, and thereby having initiated a
relationship with the confining state, possibly resulting in
changes in the conditions of the prisoner's immediate con-
finement-may have sufficient contacts with the confining state
to satisfy the minimum-contacts test, the confining state lacks
such minimum contacts with the demanding state.
In summary, the arguments that can be employed success-
fully to establish the joint jurisdiction necessary to the adjudica-
tion of the validity and impact of a detainer in the confining
jurisdiction cannot be used to establish similar jurisdiction in the
demanding state.
III. VENUE AND CONSIDERATIONS OF CONVENIENCE
Under the federal habeas statutes and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a federal district court in a habeas proceeding
in the confining state has jurisdiction over the custodians of the
demanding and confining states, and may therefore decide
claims relating to both the validity and the present impact of a
foreign detainer. On the other hand, a district court in the de-
manding state has in personam jurisdiction only over the custo-
dian of the forum state, and can thus determine only claims
relating to the validity of the detainer. Consequently, judicial
efficiency is maximized if the prisoner petitions in the confining
state. A district court in the confining state, however, may not
always be the most convenient forum in which to proceed.
Whether a district court in the confining state is a more conve-
nient forum than a district court in the demanding state may
depend upon whether the habeas proceeding involves an exami-
nation of trial proceedings, pretrial events, or post-trial events.
The nature of the habeas proceeding is determined in turn by
whether the challenged detainer was issued for a parole viola-
tion, a conviction, an indictment, or merely an arrest warrant.
In the case of a detainer based on an arrest warrant, the
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only question raised in a habeas action might be whether there
was probable cause to arrest, the determination of which may
entail only the examination of the contents of an affidavit. A
hearing involving witnesses may be unnecessary. Similarly, if an
indictment underlies a detainer and the prisoner is claiming his
right to a speedy trial, a record containing all relevant judicial
administrative decisions might be stipulated. Consequently, in
certain cases scant reason may exist not to adjudicate the effect
and validity of a foreign detainer in a single action.
7 6
When the detainer is based on a conviction that has survived
the prisoner's state-provided post-conviction collateral attacks,
any nonfrivolous claim requiring an evidentiary hearing will
probably necessitate the production of a number of witnesses,
perhaps including opposing counsel and the presiding judge
from the original trial. 77 In addition, because the judgment of
the demanding state would be challenged in the habeas proceed-
ing, a court situated in that state would be more familiar with
any aspects of state law that might arise in the hearing.7 8 Also,
necessary records would be easily accessible by a court in the
demanding state. On the other hand, if the habeas action were
maintained in the demanding state, pretrial conferences between
the petitioner and his counsel might be precluded as a practical
matter. The court in Word, however, in rejecting this argument
against maintaining the action in the demanding state, noted
that no major problems had arisen in the analogous situation of
federal prisoners' seeking post-conviction relief in sentencing
courts not located in the districts of confinement.
79
Thus, on balance, when a detainer is based on a conviction,
the difficulties inherent in transporting what may be a large
number of people to the confining state, the familiarity of a
court in the demanding state with the relevant state law, and the
availability of necessary records may outweigh the burden of
transporting the prisoner to the demanding state (including the
risk of escape 80 ) and the unfairness to the prisoner of his having
to bring two actions instead of one. Thus, a district court in the
"See Norris v. Georgia, 357 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (W.D.N.C. 1973), afrd in part,
rev'd in part, 522 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1975). The same may be true when a parole
violation underlies a detainer. Cf. Dillworth v. Barker, 465 F.2d 1138, 1341 (5th Cir.
1972).
7 See Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352; 356 (4th Cir. 1969).
" See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 499 (1973).
79 Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352, 357 (4th Cir. 1969).
"0 See generally Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 501 (1973)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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demanding state may be the more convenient forum for ad-
judicating a challenge to the validity of the detainer.8' In fact,
were jurisdiction exercised routinely by a court in the confining
state, witnesses, counsel, and records located in the demanding
state might often be subject to court orders to appear in another
state. Such a result might impede the effective utilization of de-
tainers.
In certain situations, however, fairness demands that the
prisoner be able to attack the validity of a detainer in the state of
his confinement, as when the prisoner is seriously ill and cannot
be transported any distance, or when the prisoner can demon-
strate that he would be prejudiced in the district court in the
demanding state. When more than one foreign detainer is in-
volved, as in Norris v. Georgia,82 fairness might call for the same
resolution.
Recognizing that considerations of convenience may on oc-
casion dictate that a challenge to the validity of a detainer be
heard in the demanding state does not necessarily vitiate the
effect of holding that the confining state has in personam juris-
diction over the foreign custodian and thus has the ability to
entertain a challenge to the validity of the detainer. Assuming
such jurisdiction exists, a prisoner who desires to challenge both
the validity and the impact of a foreign detainer may petition
initially a district court in the confining state. Then, if considera-
tions of convenience so require, the court may transfer the
habeas proceeding, insofar as it relates to the validity of the
detainer, to a district court in the demanding state. 83 At the same
time, the district court in the confining state can retain jurisdic-
tion over claims relating to the present effects of the detainer, so
that such claims can be adjudicated once the validity of the de-
tainer has been determined. 84 In this way, a prisoner is not
forced to initiate two separate actions, and he avoids the dangers
accompanying split litigation alluded to earlier,85 such as the
confining state's not being subject to a decision by the demand-
81 See id. at 494.
82 522 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1975).
83 See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). For a
discussion of long-arm statutes and the forum non conveniens rationale, see Casad, Long
Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (1971); Morley, Forum Non Conveniens:
Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 24 (1973).
84 The court may order separate trials of any claims or issues. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
If, however, the adjudication of the detainer's validity and effects involves common
elements, or could be accomplished more conveniently and fairly in a single proceed-
ing, the court may decide not to order separate actions.85 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
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ing state invalidating the detainer. Thus, the district court in the
confining state will be able to select the forum most convenient
for the litigation, while ensuring that basic considerations of
fairness to the prisoner are respected.
IV. CONCLUSION
A state prisoner whose confinement is affected by an out-
of-state detainer will confront jurisdictional difficulties if he at-
tempts to challenge the validity and effect of the detainer in a
single federal habeas proceeding. Due to the absence of any
activity by the confining state in the demanding state, a district
court in the demanding state cannot obtain in personamjurisdic-
tion over the prisoner's immediate custodian. Consequently, a
court in the demanding state cannot entertain claims relating to
the present impact of the detainer. Most courts have ruled that
a district court in the confining state is without jurisdiction over
the prisoner's foreign custodian and is thus unable to adjudicate
claims relating to the validity of the detainer. Nevertheless, rely-
ing on a theory similar to that employed successfully by soldiers
seeking release from unlawful military commands, a prisoner
might use the confining state's long-arm statute to serve pro-
cess on his foreign custodian, thereby enabling a court in the
confining state to determine claims relating to both the effect
and validity of the detainer. The district court in the confining
state can then, if necessary for practical reasons, transfer to a
district court in the demanding state claims concerning the va-
lidity of the detainer, while retaining jurisdiction over claims
relating to the effect of the detainer. By this procedure, the
interests of fairness and judicial efficiency would be furthered.
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